As already mentioned Rodrik provides an explanation

As already mentioned, Rodrik (2006) provides an explanation called self-insurance protection against the capital outflows or changes in the exchange rate that may lead to a crisis. He also notes two types of costs involved in hoarding international reserves: (1) the spread between “the private sector\'s cost of short-term borrowing abroad and the yield that the Central Bank earns on its liquid foreign assets” (Rodrik, 2006, 7) such as T-bills; and (2) the loss of buying T-bills instead of increasing the stock of capital or social spending (antipoverty programs). Some post-Keynesian scholars argue in the same vein considering the last point: As long as international reserves go beyond 5 or 6 percent of GDP, the surplus can be used to increase the stock of capital (Cruz, 2006). Post-Keynesian scholars also comment that capital controls and not the increase of foreign exchange reserve prevent outflow of capital and exchange rate problems (Grabel, 2003; Cruz, 2006). Of course, increases in the stock of capital as well as capital controls may be desirable, but this position neglects the fact that institutions in each underdeveloped country are embedded, and that to establish capital controls in all the countries as in the Golden Age is not possible right now, given the correlation of forces among the elite and between the elite and working class. Also, post-Keynesian scholars forget the zolmitriptan of the profit rate. Some Marxists (Lapavitsas 2013; Labrinidis 2014) notes that accumulation of foreign exchange is due to the function of money as world money. Certain currencies, therefore, go beyond their national space and serve as an international means of payment and hoarding. Advanced countries with quasi-world money, such as the us, Germany, and Japan have to keep a certain amount of foreign exchange reserves. Meanwhile, underdeveloped countries that intend to have quasi-world money have to hoard vast amounts of foreign exchange reserves. Labrinidis (2014) and Persaud (2004) point out that China is the leading candidate to have quasi-world money in the future. That this argument may be valid for China, but not for Brazil and other Latin American countries, makes sense, because there are other economic and institutional factors that might influence whether a currency is quasi-world money (Lapavitsas 2006). Among these factors are economic growth and an army. However, the function of hoarding can give each country the appearance of strength. As Marx notes (1946; 1980), hoarding damages the industrial capitalist and leads an economy towards deflation, but in some ancient societies hoarding was the expression of social wealth. Hoarding, then, may also represent power and give weak countries the appearance of strength.
Conclusion
Introducción Son claros los esfuerzos que se han hecho en todos los campos en esta región para resolver los problemas, -que por la interconexión del sistema bancario mundial y unas regulaciones bancarias “relajadas”-, como efecto de la globalización aflora la crisis originada en Estados Unidos antes de terminar la primera década del siglo xxi, cuando justo al iniciar el nuevo milenio la economía europea parecía que tenía muchas razones para ser optimista acerca de sus perspectivas de convertirse en un verdadero motor de crecimiento. “Entre 2002 y 2008 aumento el crédito de forma irresponsable gestando el preludio de una grave recesión en las economías maduras, que primero afecto a la economía estadunidense y rápidamente se extendió a Europa” (Aldcroft, 2012, p. 453). Poco a poco se fueron aceptando las causas que pusieron en peligro al euro ubicadas por varios especialistas en la gestación misma de la política monetaria, de modo que la actuación de autoridades e instituciones correspondientes en la ue y en la Euro Zona (ez) fueron asumiendo una serie de respuestas para tratar de combatirla y al mismo tiempo lograr el crecimiento económico para disminuir el alto desempleo que iba aumentando en varios países de manera alarmante.